Sodomy Laws - History of Sodomy

The Sensibilities of Our Forefathers
The History of Sodomy Laws in the United States

By George Painter
© Copyright, George Painter 1991-2005

Washington
"[Spokane] will become a city of sodomy."

The Post-Revolution Period, 1776-1873

The organic act for the Washington Territory ¹ adopted all laws of Oregon extant as of March 2, 1853, the date of the organic law. Fortunately for Washingtonians, Oregon did not have a sodomy law on the books on this date, but did several months afterwards. As a result, sodomy was legal in Washington.

Period Summary: Washington had the good fortune of being created as a territory when it was, because only a year later, its history would have been different. At its creation, it received the laws of Oregon. Early in 1853, Oregon was without a sodomy law, but enacted one toward the end of the year.

The Victorian Morality Period, 1873-1948

I. Sodomy

Although there was no sodomy law, in 1875 a vagrancy statute was enacted. ² Included in the definition were any "disorderly persons," ³ a convenient catchall that could have been used in lieu of a sodomy law.

This situation did not change until the adoption of a new code in 1881 ⁴ that recognized common-law crimes. ⁵

In its first constitution from 1889, Washington pioneered the right to privacy by enacting a completely worthless provision reading

No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law. ⁶

As written, any statute, enacted for any purpose whatever, can be used to override privacy rights.

In the first reported sodomy case in the state, State v. Place, ⁷ from 1893, the Washington Supreme Court held an information for an assault to commit sodomy under the common-law section to be valid. However, the Court overturned the conviction because of a trial error regarding the jury. ⁸

The Washington legislature panicked as a result of Place, because the Court had noted the absence of a sodomy law. Just 19 days after the decision was announced, a sodomy statute was enacted ⁹ that adopted the common-law definition of the crime and established a penalty of 10-14 years in prison. ¹⁰ An emergency clause was included because "there is not now any statute of this state providing for the punishment of the crime against nature[.]" ¹¹

In the 1899 case of State v. Romans, ¹² the Washington Supreme Court sustained an information saying that Romans committed an "assault upon a male person and, against the order of nature, had a venereal affair with and carnally knew such male person" to be sufficient. ¹³

In a comprehensive criminal code revision in 1909, ¹⁴ a crime was defined as "an act or omission forbidden by law," ¹⁵ which may have been considered an abrogation of common-law crimes. The sodomy law was amended to include use of the "mouth or tongue," ¹⁶ and lower the penalty to a maximum of 10 years. ¹⁷ Another provision prohibited the "detailed account" in newspapers of

the commission or attempted commission of the crime of rape, carnal knowledge, seduction, adultery, sodomy or any other sexual crime, or of the trial of any person charged therewith[.] ¹⁸

Another section in the new code expanded the vagrancy law ¹⁹ to include "[l]ewd, disorderly or dissolute person[s]." ²⁰

In 1911, a Department of the Washington Supreme Court, deciding State v. McDowell, ²¹ upheld a conviction for assault with intent to commit sodomy. Rejected as errors in the trial were the state requirement that all jurors be taxpayers, thus authorizing a biased jury, ²² and leading questions asked of the alleged victim. ²³

Also in 1911, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, decided State v. Douglass. ²⁴ The Court unanimously sustained a sodomy conviction even though the complaining witness made "an exaggerated statement as to the number of times a certain thing had been done" and then admitted that it wasn’t true. ²⁵

In a third case from 1911, State v. Harsted, ²⁶ a Department of the Washington Supreme Court upheld a sodomy conviction even though the complaining witness, an 11-year-old boy, reportedly had syphilis of the mouth, but the defendant did not have syphilis. The defendant wanted this evidence admitted to prove the immorality of the boy, but the trial court refused, and the Supreme Court upheld the ruling. ²⁷

In the 1914 case of State v. George, ²⁸ the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, unanimously overturned a conviction for an "attempt" to commit sodomy, deciding that this did not constitute an "assault" to commit the act. ²⁹

The Washington Supreme Court, in the 1921 case of State v. Demas, ³⁰ prohibited the introduction into evidence of alleged acts of "immorality" by the complaining witness. Solely because Demas tried to prove "individual acts of immorality," rather than the witness’s "reputation," the Court ruled that the trial judge properly barred the questioning. ³¹ The witness, Milton Draper, allegedly had

been found in the commission of immoral acts while attending the school under * * * especially the class of Mr. Duskin, and that he exhibited an immoral character. ³²

In 1922, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, ruled in State v. Psaras ³³ that sodomy convictions could be secured based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. ³⁴

In 1927, in a non-sodomy case, State v. Wray, ³⁵ a Department of the Washington Supreme Court overturned the George precedent that an "attempt" did not necessarily constitute an "assault" to commit sodomy. Wray, accused of attempted larceny, relied on George to establish his defense, but the Court said that some of the statements in that case

seem to be inconsistent with our holding in the present case, and in so far as they are inconsistent they are overruled. ³⁶

In 1930, in State v. Bestolas et al., ³⁷ a Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously upheld the consensual sodomy conviction of one man, even though his partner in the same act was acquitted. John Bestolas and Alfred Brewer were caught by private security guards while engaging in fellatio in a railroad yard in Tacoma. They confessed their guilt to the guards, but then denied the confessions and claimed that they were obtained only under coercion. ³⁸ The jury convicted Bestolas of sodomy, but acquitted Brewer, even though their confessions were equal. Bestolas then contended that, since they were accused of consensual activity with each other, Brewer’s acquittal required his. The Court disagreed, saying, without explanation, that "the verdict of the jury was amply warranted by the evidence." ³⁹

The next reported case was also one of consensual fellatio. In 1932, in State v. Fry, ⁴⁰ the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, rejected the contention that the fellatee could not be prosecuted under the wording of the 1909 sodomy law. The Court said that "[t]he filthiness and proscription rests equally upon both." ⁴¹ The man who allegedly fellated Fry denied on the stand that Fry had done the same to him, apparently to protect him. However, he had earlier made an affidavit admitting to the act, and this was admitted into evidence to contradict his statement. ⁴²

In 1933, in State v. Chubb, ⁴³ a Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed that sodomy defendants could be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. ⁴⁴

In 1936, in State v. Oberg, ⁴⁵ the Washington Supreme Court, In Department, upheld the introduction of evidence concerning "indecent books and pictures" against a sodomy defendant. Conceding that the trial record was "somewhat confusing," ⁴⁶ the Court decided that the literature shown to the teenage males involved

were calculated to arouse lascivious thoughts on the part of those who saw or read them, particularly those who were of an adolescent age, as were the younger boys. ⁴⁷

Curiously, the older "boys" were above the age of adolescence.

In 1937, a Department of the Washington Supreme Court reversed a conviction for attempted sodomy in State v. Ficklin. ⁴⁸ Lyle Ficklin had been convicted of the attempt on the following testimony of the complaining witness:

We went to bed and Mr. Ficklin tried to take hold of my penis, and I told him to cut it out and he didn’t, so I pushed him away[.] ⁴⁹

The Court felt that this was not supported by other evidence, and the count could not stand. ⁵⁰

In 1938, in State v. Boyles, ⁵¹ a Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously upheld a sodomy conviction committed on a "boy" (who was old enough to be employed by the defendant) who did not make a complaint until three months after the fact, and continued to work for the defendant. ⁵² The Court also discussed the acquittal of Boyles as to a charge against a 26-year-old "boy." ⁵³

In the 1944 case State v. Swane, ⁵⁴ a Department of the Washington Supreme Court reversed a sodomy conviction because the state was able to prove only an attempt. ⁵⁵ Justice John Robinson opened the opinion with the moralizing statement that the

subject matter of this appeal is of such a disgusting nature that only an irreducible minimum of the particulars will be recited in this opinion. ⁵⁶

Robinson also wrote the Court’s decision in the 1945 case State v. Collier. ⁵⁷ The testimony of a minor male was considered competent because he

recited prayers at his school; that he said his prayers at night, but not every night; that he knew it was wrong to lie or steal; that the Bible was about Jesus, and more to the same general effect. ⁵⁸

Another boy had been asked "What is the Bible?" and "Who is God?" and his answers satisfied the Court that he was competent to testify. ⁵⁹

Washington enacted a psychopathic offender law in 1947. ⁶⁰ Anyone convicted of sodomy as well as "any disorderly conduct involving a sex offense" were subject to the law. ⁶¹ To be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any psychopathy proceeding were "any and all properly certified judgments and sentences of prior convictions of sex offenses[.]" ⁶² If found to be a "criminal sexual psychopath" and committed to prison, the individual could be sent to a mental institution after completing the prison term, if "found not to be safe at large[.]" ⁶³ Although either the prisoner or a psychiatrist could petition for release based on recovery from the psychopathy, the petition was limited to once per year. ⁶⁴

II. Sterilization

Another provision in the 1909 criminal code revision made Washington the second state to adopt a sterilization law. ⁶⁵ The trial court was permitted to order sterilization for anyone "adjudged to be an habitual criminal." ⁶⁶

The Washington Supreme Court was the first to deal with the constitutionality of a sterilization law in the 1912 case State v. Feilen. ⁶⁷ In a decision glaringly out of kilter with the other decisions of the next decade, a Department of the Court unanimously upheld the provision. The heterosexual defendant was convicted of statutory rape and the Court, speaking through Justice Herman Crow, said that statutory rape was

brutal, heinous, and revolting, and [a crime] for which, if the Legislature so determined, the death penalty might be inflicted without infringement of any constitutional justification. ⁶⁸

Thus, if death was constitutional, sterilization had to be as well. ⁶⁹ Peter Feilen duly was subjected to a vasectomy against his will, and he was the only person sterilized under the 1909 law. ⁷⁰ He later was found to be innocent of the crime for which he was imprisoned and sterilized and was pardoned by the Governor, but nothing could restore his procreative functions. ⁷¹

A new sterilization law was enacted in 1921. ⁷² Washington became another of the states to require quarterly reporting of inmates of any state institutions who were "feeble minded, insane, epileptic, habitual criminals, moral degenerates and sexual perverts" for possible sterilization. ⁷³

Through the end of 1934, there were only 30 sterilizations under the broad law. The legislature failed to appropriate money to enforce it, one reason for the low number. ⁷⁴

Money later flowed, because the sterilization law had been used on 684 people by 1942. ⁷⁵ It was found unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme Court in In Re Hendrickson ⁷⁶ that year. The Court, by a 4-3 vote, found that the provision allowing the serving of notice on the insane and mentally retarded was insufficient, since their mental condition did not allow them fully to understand the nature of the notice. ⁷⁷ The dissenters agreed that the law was unconstitutional as applied to the insane and mentally retarded, but they did not believe that the whole law had to fall because of one bad provision. ⁷⁸

Period Summary: Washington enacted a new criminal code in 1881 that, although silent on sodomy, recognized common-law crimes. A decade later, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that this provision permitted prosecution of an assault to commit the crime, but pointed out the lack of a specific sodomy law. Reacting faster than any other legislature ever did, a sodomy law was enacted just 19 days later. It used the common-law definition, but was amended in 1909 specifically to include oral sex. Sodomy convictions almost always were upheld by appellate courts. Washington was one of the first states to enact a sterilization law, and it was the first state (and only one through the early 1920s) to have the constitutionality of its law upheld. Later, however, just three months before the U.S. Supreme Court put an end to criminal sterilization, the Washington Supreme Court reversed course and struck down its law on due process grounds.

The Kinsey Period, 1948-1986

Washington revised its psychopathic offender law in 1949. ⁷⁹ This law undertook to protect some civil liberties that other states did not, including Washington in its first law. First, anyone committed under the law was guaranteed "humane care and treatment" and the right to "be restored to a normal mental condition as rapidly as possible with an avoidance of loss of civil rights when not necessary[.]" ⁸⁰ Also, anyone not acting in good faith in referring a person under the law could be prosecuted criminally. ⁸¹ The law defined "sexual psychopaths" as people predisposed "to the commission of sexual offenses, and in a degree constituting him a menace to the health or safety of others," ⁸² a condition not found in the original law. The law applied to minors as well as to adults. ⁸³

In the 1949 case State v. Brown, ⁸⁴ the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, unanimously affirmed one sodomy conviction of a man, while reversing another. His alibi against the second count was of being out of town on the date of the alleged offense. Brown provided canceled checks written in San Francisco the day before and the day after the alleged offense in Spokane, but the prosecution contended that he could have been in San Francisco, flown to Spokane for an act of sodomy, and flown back to San Francisco the next day. ⁸⁵ The Court was not sympathetic, however, to the claim that Brown’s consenting partner, Dale Williams, was not arrested also. Williams was given immunity in exchange for testifying against Brown, and the prosecutor erroneously informed the jury that Williams was immune as a matter of law. ⁸⁶ Also not considered prejudicial to Brown were statements to the jury that "this [Spokane] will become a city of sodomy," that the defendant was "a pervert," and that he "does not think like we do." ⁸⁷ The Court believed that, since Brown was guilty of sex perversion, referring to him as a "pervert" or saying that he thought differently from other people was not prejudicial. ⁸⁸ The Court also was unsympathetic to the claim by Brown’s attorney that Dale Williams testified only under threat of police prosecution. ⁸⁹

The psychopathic offender law was amended in 1951 ⁹⁰ to become more specific regarding the definition of sex offenders. Both sodomy and "vagrancy involving immoral or sexual conduct" were now triggering offenses, as was an attempt to commit either. ⁹¹ The acts had to constitute "a menace to the health or safety of others" in order to bring the offender under the law. ⁹² The law also eliminated the civil liberties protections created in the previous law.

In 1953, a Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously reversed a sodomy conviction in the case of State v. Olsen. ⁹³ A man had been convicted for placing his mouth and tongue on a girl’s vagina. The Court said that

either the male or female sexual organ must be involved before there can be carnal knowing of one person by another within the purview of the sodomy statute. The only sexual organ involved in this case is that of the female. We cannot hold that a touching of that organ with the mouth or tongue constitutes carnally knowing the female, since touching it with the male sexual organ does not constitute carnal knowledge. ⁹⁴

The Court concluded that the tongue actually had to penetrate the female organ in order to accomplish sodomy. ⁹⁵

In 1955, in State v. Charley, ⁹⁶ the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, unanimously overturned a sodomy conviction. The Court acknowledged that, from the evidence, it was "easy to infer that penetration was probably effected," but it also was possible that only an attempt was made, or that "other sexual misconduct" occurred. ⁹⁷

In the 1963 case State v. Ridley, ⁹⁸ a Department of the Washington Supreme Court, with one member absent, unanimously upheld the right of the prosecution to ask leading questions of the defendant’s two stepsons, who were reluctant to testify against him. The Court concluded that the questions were "justified under the circumstances." ⁹⁹

A few months later, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc, decided State v. Rose. ¹⁰⁰ The Court divided 5-4 to reverse a sodomy conviction because the prosecution had, in addressing the jury, referred to Rose as a "drunken homosexual." ¹⁰¹ Writing for the dissenters, Chief Justice Ott complained that, in light of

the vile details of the act of sodomy by mouth being accomplished in the presence of the officers, and the sordid evidence with relation thereto, the descriptive adjective "drunken" could not have prejudiced the defendant, or detracted in the slightest degree from the repulsive, degrading, and obscene act which the jury found the defendant had committed. ¹⁰²

Obviously, Ott and the other dissenters believed that an act of fellatio was so repulsive in and of itself that no terminology describing it negatively could affect the jurors’ fairness.

In the 1965 case of State v. Holbrook, ¹⁰³ the Washington Supreme Court, sitting In Department, unanimously upheld the sodomy conviction of a man over his argument that the prosecuting attorney’s final argument to the jury constituted misconduct. The defendant curiously did not provide the Court any copy of the statements, so it was unable to rule on the point. ¹⁰⁴

The most important sodomy case from Washington was State v. Rhinehart, ¹⁰⁵ decided in 1967. Sitting In Department, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Keith Rhinehart and rejected the first privacy challenge to the law. Rhinehart had picked up 16-year-old James Miller in Downtown Seattle and asked him if he wanted to make money. Miller agreed and went with Rhinehart to his apartment, voluntarily participating in sexual relations. The Court, for some reason, noted that Rhinehart’s apartment contained photographs of nude males, wood carvings, and a round bed. ¹⁰⁶ Rhinehart then dropped Miller off Downtown and gave him his phone number to call when "he wanted to earn some more money." ¹⁰⁷ Miller was picked up by police a couple of days later on a prowling charge, but was released without charges being pressed. For unstated reasons, the day after his release, Miller went to the police to file a complaint against Rhinehart. ¹⁰⁸ The Court rejected Rhinehart’s request for a new trial on the basis of Miller’s recanting his trial testimony ¹⁰⁹ as well as the testimony that he possessed magazines with photos of nude males being prejudicial. ¹¹⁰ The most important argument of Rhinehart’s that the Court rejected was that the sodomy law was unconstitutional as an invasion of privacy. The Court believed that there was

no merit to this contention. The legislature has, by this enactment, considered the public interest served by it. The prohibition of the statute is a proper exercise of the police power. ¹¹¹

Also rejected were a challenge on the ground of vagueness ¹¹² and the establishment of religion. ¹¹³ Rhinehart challenged the law as "impos[ing] their ethics on others who follow homosexual practices," ¹¹⁴ but the Court said that it "found no merit in this contention," referring to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding bans on polygamy and snake handling over objections of religious minorities. ¹¹⁵

Rhinehart also filed a federal habeas corpus petition. In 1969, in Rhinehart v. Rhay, ¹¹⁶ a Ninth Circuit panel unanimously overturned a trial court’s dismissal of his petition. He had claimed discriminatory enforcement of the law in cases of "private, consensual incidents between sexually mature adults." The Court felt that factual issues presented in the petition needed to be addressed by the trial court and remanded the case. ¹¹⁷ Nothing more is known of the case.

Keith Rhinehart returned to court in 1970, again in federal court, putting up an admirable fight from prison in Walla Walla against state regulation of private sexual activity. In Rhinehart v. Rhay, ¹¹⁸ he revealed that he refused to be docile and meekly accept his fate. He argued that many of the letters he had sent to his attorney in Seattle had been intercepted and held by prison authorities. ¹¹⁹ Judge William Gray noted, without criticism, that prison regulations prohibited mailing "complaints about institution personnel, inmates or policies." ¹²⁰ Apparently inmates could discuss only how happy they were to be in prison. Gray read the intercepted letters and noted that Rhinehart, ironically, informed his attorney that prisoners were engaging in sodomy freely while the state prosecuted those doing the same thing outside the walls. Gray believed that these letters "reveal a pathological fixation with the subject of sodomy." ¹²¹ Gray also felt that it was "readily understandable" why the prison authorities did not want the letters to reach the outside. ¹²² Rhinehart noted in his letters that he had been placed in solitary confinement for

having protested the policy of the prison that required each inmate to have a conference with the Catholic chaplain, and by his insistence upon referring to such chaplain as "Mr. McCabe" rather than "Father McCabe." ¹²³

The claim was "frivolous," thought Gray, because Rhinehart

was a very antagonistic and uncooperative prisoner and that his attitudes and expressions would have tried the patience of the most understanding of prison officials. To whatever extent, if at all, the plaintiff’s imprisonment in solitary confinement was for reasons other than his refusal to work, it is evident that such punishment was minor and stemmed from the plaintiff’s own conduct. ¹²⁴

The Court also rejected Rhinehart’s arguments that while in prison he was given

unneeded sedatives and other medical treatment against his will, and that this constitutes a violation of his civil rights. It is not the responsibility of a federal court to second guess the medical diagnosis or treatment prescribed by state prison officials. ¹²⁵

Keith Rhinehart was released from prison in 1972, having been let out 3½ years early due to accumulation of "good time" credit. ¹²⁶

In State v. Paradis, ¹²⁷ also from 1967, a Department of the Washington Supreme Court unanimously upheld the sodomy conviction of a man based entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of teenage males who were willing accomplices. ¹²⁸

In 1972, two men were arrested at a skating rink in the Seattle area for holding hands while skating. Upon their arrest, police argued among themselves as to what law they would use to charge them, trying to find one that would stand up in court. As a result of the arrest, a protest at the rink was conducted by a number of same-sex couples holding hands. ¹²⁹

The last reported sodomy case in Washington was State v. Sawyer, ¹³⁰ from 1975, just four months before repeal of the sodomy law. The Court of Appeals rejected Sawyer’s claim that fellatio was not made a crime by the sodomy law, because it only referred to "carnal knowledge." Although acknowledging that the precise challenge raised by Sawyer never had been addressed by the Washington courts, the Court of Appeals noted that fellatio convictions previously had been sustained, and rejected his claim. ¹³¹

In 1975, the Washington legislature enacted two laws: a comprehensive criminal code revision ¹³² that repealed the sodomy and vagrancy laws, ¹³³ and a sexual assault law that established an age of consent of 16 for sexual conduct, and 14 for sexual contact. ¹³⁴ In addition, prostitution between persons of the same sex was recognized ¹³⁵ and the crime of "communication with a minor for immoral purposes" was created ¹³⁶ that apparently made it a crime to engage in any kind of conversation about sex with a minor. The code also recognized common-law crimes. ¹³⁷

The law banning newspaper publication of crimes of sodomy remained on the books until 1982. ¹³⁸

Period Summary: Reacting to the anti-homosexual hysteria during the McCarthy era, Washington revised its psychopathic offender law to eliminate all of the civil liberties guarantees it had created. Sodomy convictions continued generally to be upheld by courts, and an early privacy argument was rejected by the Washington Supreme Court in 1967 and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the decision. A new criminal code in 1975 repealed the sodomy law, but retained common-law crimes. This new code left a contradictory age of consent that remained uncorrected to the end of the era.

The Post-Hardwick Period, 1986-Present

The disparity in the age of consent was not changed until 1988 when a new law ¹³⁹ raised the age to 16 for sexual contact. ¹⁴⁰

The Court of Appeals, deciding City of Tukwila v. Nalder ¹⁴¹ in 1989, voted 2-1 to suppress a police officer’s eyewitness testimony. Officer Chris Hurst entered a public restroom and, as he said he routinely did, peered through cracks in closed stalls looking for "lewd conduct." He also entered a neighboring stall and peered over the top and found Nalder masturbating, then arrested him. ¹⁴² The Court found Hurst’s actions "sufficiently offensive to the privacy interests of citizens of this state to be deemed an unlawful search." ¹⁴³

In 1990, the Washington Court of Appeals, in Adult Entertainment Center, Inc. et al. v. Pierce County et al., ¹⁴⁴ unanimously upheld a county ordinance requiring doorless viewing booths in adult theatres. The Washington Supreme Court refused to review the decision. ¹⁴⁵

Although the sodomy law was repealed, the common-law crime statute remains, and case law in Washington is that repeal of a statute in derogation of the common law revives the common-law provision on the subject, ¹⁴⁶ thus making anal sex indictable in the state.

Period Summary: Washington courts followed the national trend by finding a privacy interest in sex in enclosed public restroom stalls, but not in enclosed adult theatre booths. The age of consent was clarified with the legislature choosing the higher age of the conflicting ones it originally created in the 1975 criminal code revision. Despite repeal of the sodomy law, Washington continues to recognize common-law crimes and case law supporting the common-law reception statute show that a prosecutor choosing to do so can bring charges against consensual anal sex in the state.

Footnotes

¹ 10 Stat. 172, enacted Mar. 2, 1853.

² Laws of Washington 1875, page 89, "An Act Defining Vagrancy and Providing Remedy Against," enacted Nov. 12, 1875.

³ Id. at 90, §1.

⁴ Code of Washington 1881, (Olympia:C.B. Bagley, 1881), page 29, §1952, enacted Dec. 1, 1881.

⁵ Id. at 159, §782.

⁶ Washington Constitution, Art. 1, §7, adopted Oct. 1, 1889. Both because of the flimsiness of this provision and the repeal of the Washington sodomy law, I have not analyzed case law under this section. However, I was informed by Mr. Joseph C. Greene of Washington that the provision has been interpreted much more broadly than the wording would have a reader believe.

⁷ 32 P. 736, decided Feb. 18, 1893.

⁸ Id. at 737.

⁹ Laws of Washington 1893, page 470, ch. CXXXIX, enacted Mar. 9, 1893, but not signed by the Governor. It became effective Mar. 14, 1893 after Governor John Harte McGraw sent it to the Secretary of State without his signature.

¹⁰ Id.

¹¹ Id. §3.

¹² 57 P. 819, decided June 22, 1899.

¹³ Id. at 820.

¹⁴ Laws of Washington 1909, page 890, ch. 249, enacted Mar. 22, 1909.

¹⁵ Id. §1.

¹⁶ Id. at 950, §204.

¹⁷ Id.

¹⁸ Id. §209.

¹⁹ Id. at 1027, §436.

²⁰ Id. at 1028, §7.

²¹ 112 P. 521, decided Jan. 3, 1911.

²² Id.

²³ Id. at 523.

²⁴ 118 P. 915, decided Nov. 27, 1911.

²⁵ Id.

²⁶ 119 P. 24, decided Dec. 4, 1911.

²⁷ Id. at 25.

²⁸ 140 P. 337, decided Apr. 27, 1914.

²⁹ Id. at 338-339.

³⁰ 195 P. 1001, decided Feb. 23, 1921.

³¹ Id. at 1002.

³² Id.

³³ 208 P. 1094, decided Aug. 29, 1922.

³⁴ Id.

³⁵ 253 P. 801, decided Mar. 7, 1927.

³⁶ Id. at 802.

³⁷ 283 P. 687, decided Jan. 10, 1930.

³⁸ Id.

³⁹ Id. at 688.

⁴⁰ 13 P.2d 491, decided Aug. 17, 1932.

⁴¹ Id. at 492.

⁴² Id.

⁴³ 27 P.2d 689, decided Dec. 13, 1933.

⁴⁴ Id.

⁴⁵ 60 P.2d 66, decided Aug. 21, 1936.

⁴⁶ Id. at 68.

⁴⁷ Id.

⁴⁸ 67 P.2d 897, decided Apr. 26, 1937.

⁴⁹ Id. at 899.

⁵⁰ Id.

⁵¹ 82 P.2d 575, decided Sep. 6, 1938.

⁵² Id. at 577.

⁵³ Id.

⁵⁴ 153 P.2d 311, decided Nov. 16, 1944.

⁵⁵ Id. at 312.

⁵⁶ Id. at 311.

⁵⁷ 162 P.2d 267, decided Sep. 22, 1945.

⁵⁸ Id. at 272.

⁵⁹ Id.

⁶⁰ Laws of Washington 1947, page 1161, ch. 273, enacted Mar. 21, 1947, effective immediately.

⁶¹ Id. §1(b).

⁶² Id. at 1163, §(d).

⁶³ Id. at 1164, §(g).

⁶⁴ Id. at 1167, §(i).

⁶⁵ Laws of Washington 1909, page 890, ch. 249, at 899, §35, enacted Mar. 22, 1909.

⁶⁶ Id. This law was alleged by one masculinist writer to have been "sneaked through" the legislature and that the Governor of Washington was a "coward" for being afraid to veto it. See The Patriarch, Sep. 14, 1912, 1:1.

⁶⁷ 126 P. 75, decided Sep. 3, 1912.

⁶⁸ Id. at 76.

⁶⁹ Id.

⁷⁰ Harry Hamilton Laughlin, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States, (Chicago:Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Court of Chicago, 1922), page 91.

⁷¹ Id. at 292.

⁷² Laws of Washington 1921, page 162, ch. 53, enacted Mar. 8, 1921.

⁷³ Id. at 163, §1.

⁷⁴ Abraham Myerson, et al., Eugenical Sterilization: A Reorientation of the Problem, (New York:Macmillan, 1936), page 19.

⁷⁵ Moya Woodside, Sterilization in North Carolina: A Sociological and Psychological Study, (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1950), pages 194-195.

⁷⁶ 123 P.2d 322, decided Mar. 5, 1942.

⁷⁷ Id. at 325.

⁷⁸ Id. at 328.

⁷⁹ Laws of Washington 1949, page 604, ch. 198, enacted Mar. 19, 1949.

⁸⁰ Id. §1.

⁸¹ Id. §2.

⁸² Id. at 613-614, §25.

⁸³ Id. at 622, §51.

⁸⁴ 213 P.2d 305, decided Dec. 31, 1949. Rehearing denied Mar. 9, 1950.

⁸⁵ Id. at 307.

⁸⁶ Id. at 308.

⁸⁷ Id. at 309.

⁸⁸ Id.

⁸⁹ Id. at 310.

⁹⁰ Laws of Washington 1951, page 669, ch. 223, enacted Mar. 17, 1951.

⁹¹ Id. §2.

⁹² Id.

⁹³ 258 P.2d 810, decided June 23, 1953.

⁹⁴ Id. at 811.

⁹⁵ Id.

⁹⁶ 291 P.2d 672, decided Dec. 22, 1955.

⁹⁷ Id. at 674.

⁹⁸ 378 P.2d 700, decided Feb. 14, 1963.

⁹⁹ Id. at 702.

¹⁰⁰ 382 P.2d 513, decided June 13, 1963.

¹⁰¹ Id. at 515-516.

¹⁰² Id. at 518.

¹⁰³ 401 P.2d 971, decided May 13, 1965. Rehearing denied July 7, 1965.

¹⁰⁴ Id. at 973.

¹⁰⁵ 424 P.2d 906, decided Mar. 2, 1967. Revised Mar. 8, 1967. Rehearing denied May 3, 1967. Cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832, decided Oct. 9, 1967.

¹⁰⁶ 424 P.2d, at 907.

¹⁰⁷ Id. at 908.

¹⁰⁸ Id.

¹⁰⁹ Id.

¹¹⁰ Id.

¹¹¹ Id. at 909.

¹¹² Id. at 909-910.

¹¹³ Id. at 910.

¹¹⁴ Id.

¹¹⁵ Id.

¹¹⁶ 409 F.2d 208, decided Mar. 5, 1969. As modified Mar. 27, 1969.

¹¹⁷ Id.

¹¹⁸ 314 F.Supp. 81, decided May 27, 1970.

¹¹⁹ Id. at 82.

¹²⁰ Id.

¹²¹ Id.

¹²² Id. at 83.

¹²³ Id. at 84.

¹²⁴ Id.

¹²⁵ Id.

¹²⁶ Correspondence from David Hastings, Chief of Archives, Jan. 27, 1995.

¹²⁷ 434 P.2d 583, decided Nov. 22, 1967.

¹²⁸ Id. at 583-584.

¹²⁹ The Advocate, Vol. 85 (May 10, 1972), page 10.

¹³⁰ 532 P.2d 654, decided Feb. 21, 1975. Review by the Washington Supreme Court denied May 20, 1975.

¹³¹ Id. at 655.

¹³² Laws of Washington 1975 1st Ex. Sess., page 817, ch. 260, enacted June 27, 1975, effective July 1, 1976.

¹³³ Id. at 863 (209) (sodomy); at 866 (226) (vagrancy).

¹³⁴ Laws of Washington 1975 1st Ex. Sess., page 172, ch. 14, enacted Apr. 28, 1975. See §9.

¹³⁵ Ch. 260, at 857, §9A.88.050.

¹³⁶ Id. §9A.88.020.

¹³⁷ Id. at 823, §9A.04.060.

¹³⁸ Laws of Washington 1982, page 756, ch. 184, enacted Apr. 1, 1982. The repeal of the law is found on page 759, §11.

¹³⁹ Laws of Washington 1988, page 561, ch. 145, enacted Mar. 21, 1988, effective July 1, 1988.

¹⁴⁰ Id. at 563, §8 and §9.

¹⁴¹ 770 P.2d 670, decided Apr. 3, 1989.

¹⁴² Id. at 671-672.

¹⁴³ Id. at 674.

¹⁴⁴ 788 P.2d 1102, decided Mar. 29, 1990.

¹⁴⁵ 796 P.2d 725, decided July 2, 1990.

¹⁴⁶ State ex rel. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Frater, 140 P.2d 272, at 275, decided July 19, 1943.

Washington

• Statute: Repealed 1976

History

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